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Introduction
On August 27, 2013, Governor Jerry Brown announced his new plan
for solving the California prison crisis: The state would invest $315 million
of its reserves in private prisons, on California soil and out of state.' This
plan, promptly approved by the State Assembly, 2 would enable the state to
avoid releasing 10,000 inmates, which is the remaining number of releases
required by a federal court population reduction order. 3 "Public safety is
the priority, and we'll take care of it," the governor was quoted as saying,4
"[t]he money is there."5
This is the last in a series of moves and countermoves made by
California in an effort to comply with the letter, but circumvent the spirit of
Coleman v. Schwarzenegger6 a 2009 order by a federal three-judge panel
requiring that the state reduce its prison population to 137.5% capacity.7
This population reduction was mandated in order to improve the abysmal
health care provided to inmates, which the panel found to be causally linked
to prison overcrowding.8 The state vowed to appeal the order, but a five-to-
four majority of Supreme Court Justices affirmed it in Brown v. Plata.9
Even before the Supreme Court decision, the Schwarzenegger
administration (in which Governor Brown was Attorney General) was hard
at work trying to find solutions to prison overcrowding and its devastating
budgetary impact.' 0 In 2009, a year after the financial crisis hit private
businesses and state and local government, the average yearly cost of
incarceration was $47,000 per inmate." Some ideas for mitigating these
costs advocated by the Schwarzenegger administration, such as housing
1. Don Thompson, California Governor Proposes $315M Prison Fix, YAHOO! NEWS (Aug.
27, 2013), http://news.yahoo.com/califomia-govemor-proposes-315m-prison-fix-212715959.html
(last visited Sept. 27, 2013).
2. Patrick McGreevy, Gov. Jerry Brown's Prison Plan Clears Assembly Committee, L.A.
TIMES (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.Iatimes.com/local/la-me-prisons-20130830,0,2162429.story
(last visited Sept. 27, 2013).
3. Id.
4. Thompson, supra note 1.
5. Id.
6. See Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, 922 F. Supp. 2d 882, 962 (2009) (this case consolidated
two cases: Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM P, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
131814 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4,2009) and Plata v. Schwarzenegger, 590 F.3d 976 (2009)).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1944 (2011).
10. Margo Schlanger, Plata v. Brown and Realignment: Jails, Prisons, Courts, and Politics,
48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV., 165, 175 (2013).
11. Legislative Analyst's Office, California's Annual Costs to Incarcerate an Inmate in
Prison, 2008-2009, http://www.lao.ca.gov/laoapp/laomenus/sections/crim-justice/6_cj-inmate
cost.aspx?catid=3 (last visited Sept. 27, 2013).
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inmates in Mexico,12 were the subject of downright mockery.13 Yet, some
were more realistic, such as the idea to "downgrade" several offenses and
try them as misdemeanors, so that inmates would serve their time in county
jails in lieu of state prisons.14 The plan was submitted to the legislature,' 5
approved by the Senate,16 and then gutted by the Assembly.' 7 However, a
later reincarnation of the plan, implemented during Governor Brown's
tenure, became known as the Criminal Justice Realignment. The plan was
an amalgam of legislative pieces shifting responsibility for tens of
thousands of inmates from state prisons and parole offices to county jails
and probation offices' 9 and has been referred to as "the largest criminal
justice experiment ever conducted in America., 20
California's erratic recurrence to jurisdiction changes, inmate transfers,
in-state privatization, and out-of-state incarceration moves, draws attention
because of the size of its prison population, but it is hardly unique. The
financial crisis has thrown many state and local governments into turmoil,
requiring them to rethink their costly correctional policies. In some ways,
the crisis has had a salutary effect on incarceration in the United States.
According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2009 was the first in 37 years
in which the overall U.S. prison population has declined, and the trend has
continued through 2012.21 The financial crisis has also enabled lawmakers
and politicians to support nonpunitive policies, such as the abolition of the
12. Wyatt Buchanan, Governor Looks South of the Border for Prisons, S.F. CHRON. (Jan. 26,
2010, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Governor-looks-south-of-the-border-for-
prisons-3274745.php (last visited Sept. 27, 2013).
13. John Diaz, Have the Governor's Senses Headed South?, S.F. CHRON. (Jan. 27, 2010,
4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/article/Have-the-governor-s-senses-headed-south-
32747 10.php (last visited Aug. 28, 2013).
14. Molly Hennessy-Fiske & Richard Winton, Bid to Divert California Prisoners to County
Jails Denounced, L.A. TIMES (May 23, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/may/23/local/me-
jails23 (last visited Aug. 28, 2013).
15. Michael Rothfield, Vote on Prison Plan in California Budget is Delayed, L.A. TIMES
(July 23, 2009), http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-budget23-2009jul23,0,7093912.story
(last visited Aug. 28, 2013).
16. Matthew Yi & Wyatt Buchanan, Plan to Free State Prison Inmates Moves Ahead, S.F.
CHRON. (Aug. 21, 2009), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Plan-to-free-state-prison-inmates-
moves-ahead-3219630.php (last visited Aug. 28, 2013).
17. Matthew Yi, Prison Bill Gutted by State Assembly, S.F. CHRON. (Aug. 28, 2009),
http://www.sfgate.com/bayarealarticle/Prison-bill-gutted-by-state-Assembly-3288123.php (last
visited Aug. 28, 2013).
18. Schlanger, supra note 10, at 185.
19. Id.
20. Tim Stelloh, California 's Great Prison Experiment, THE NATION (June 5, 2013),
http://www.thenation.com/article/1 74680/califomias-great-prison-experiment#axzz2dH8EZ69x
(last visited Sept. 27, 2013).
21. U.S. Prison Population Declined for Third Consecutive Year During 2012, Bureau of
Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice (July 25, 2013), http://www.bis.gov/content/
pub/press/pl2acpr.cfm (last visited Sept. 27, 2013).
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death penalty2 2 and the legalization of marijuana,2 3 on the basis of financial
prudence without appearing "soft on crime."2 4
However, the policies and practices on the ground have been less
decisive against punitivism. States in dire economic straits have been
experimenting with increased and decreased privatization of their
institutions, rolling incarceration costs onto the inmates' shoulders,
shipping inmates to mostly private, out-of-state institutions, making
jurisdictional reform and juggling state and county responsibilities for
incarceration, and bartering and repurposing prisons for closure. Far from a
decisive pendulum swing away from the punitive trend of the forty years
that preceded the crisis, these practices are an inconsistent stream of ill-
directed emergency efforts, unaccompanied.
This article provides a survey and a critical assessment of these
developments. Part I discusses developments in prison privatization and
shows how the private prison industry has adjusted to the financial crisis by
amending its contracts with state governments and by opening up a new
market: detention for undocumented immigrants. Part II addresses the
growing tendency to roll some of the incarceration costs onto the inmates
themselves, sometimes by charging them for their jail time and sometimes
by offering special services for an added sum. Part III examines prison
closures and their mixed impact on prisoner welfare, as well as the efforts to
repurpose and efficiently utilize institutions of changing designations. Part
IV looks at inmate geographical migration, focusing on how states and
private prison providers import and export live bodies using empty beds as
a bargaining tool. Part V takes a look at realignment and other
jurisdictional changes, focusing on the displacement effect of shifting
incarceration costs from the state to the county level. We conclude by
offering some thoughts on some wiser choices in times of austerity, such as
sentencing reforms, in-prison rehabilitation programs, and investment in
reentry.
22. Hadar Aviram & Ryan Newby, Death Row Economics: The Rise ofFiscally Prudent
Anti-Death Penalty Activism, 28(1) A.B.A. CRIM. JUST. 33 (2013), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminal-justice-magazine/spi 3_death
_row economics.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Aug, 28, 2013).
23. Caroline Fairchild, Legalizing Mariuana Would Generate Billions in Additional Tax
Revenue Annually, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 20, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/2013/04/20/legalizing-marijuana-tax-revenue_n_3102003.html (last accessed Aug. 28, 2013).
See also Allison DeFoor, Florida Can Save Money, Reduce Crime, Salvage Lives, THE JOURNAL
OF THE JAMES MADISON INSTITUTE, Spring/Summer 2009, 54-58, available at
http://www.jamesmadison.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/materials/684.pdf, (last visited Sept. 27,
2013) (conservative politicians are calling for an end on the War on Drugs for fiscal reasons).
24. Aviram & Newby, supra note 22.
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I. Inside the Belly of the Beast: Private Prison Providers
and the Financial Crisis
A. Private Providers Adaptation Techniques
No explanation of recession-era prison policies is complete without
understanding the complex interactions between state and local
governments and private prison providers, which explains much (albeit not
all) of the prison construction growth since the 1960s. The end of the 20th
century and first decade of the 21st century saw a seismic shift in the
privatization of state prisons across the United States.25 Unable to shoulder
the burden placed on their taxpayers and treasuries, financially-strapped
states housing record numbers of prisoners have increasingly turned to
privatizing their prison facilities as an ostensibly cost-saving measure.26 As
of 2010, private prisons accounted for 80% of the entire national prison
population, housing "128,195 of the 1.6 million state and federal prisoners
in the United States."27 Overall, the years between 1999 and 2010 marked
an 80% increase in the number of prisoners held in private prisons, versus
an 18% increase in prisoners overall. 2 8 The prison system has borne the
brunt of this increase in prison privatization over the first decade of the 21st
century, with a rise in the number of federal prisoners in private prisons
"from 3,828 to 33,830, an increase of 784%.",29 By contrast, "the number
of state prisoners incarcerated privately grew by 40% from 67,380 to
94,365."30
Overall, 30 states now employ private prisons in housing inmates to
some degree. 31 Across the individual states, the numbers of inmates who
have been placed into and removed from private prisons has fluctuated
wildly. For example, between 1999-2010, Florida and Idaho saw an
increase in the percentage of inmates in private facilities of 213% and
459%, respectively, while Arkansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Maine, Utah,
Washington, and Nevada each saw a 100% decrease as they removed all of
their inmates from private prisons.32 Six states currently hold at least of
their inmates in private prisons, including Alaska, Montana, New Mexico,
Hawaii, Vermont, and Idaho. 33 As of 2010, Texas led in number of inmates
25. Cody Mason, Too Good to be True: Private Prisons in America, THE SENT'G PROJECT, I
(Jan. 2012), http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/incTooGood-tobeTrue.pdf.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 4-5.
28. Id. at 1.
29. Id. at 1.
30. Id.
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incarcerated privately, with 19,155 inmates held in private prisons,
followed by Florida, with 11,796 inmates held in private prisons. 3
The biggest private prison provider in the United States is the
Corrections Corporation of America (CCA),3 s a publicly traded company
incorporated in the state of Maryland.36 As of September 30, 2012, CCA
operated 67 correctional facilities37 and owned 49 facilities 3 8 located in 20
34. Too Good to be True, supra note 25 at 4-5.
35. Financial Tear Sheet, CORR. CORP. OF AM. 1, available at
http://ir.correctionscorp.com/Tearsheet.ashx?c= 117983 (last accessed Oct. 14, 2013).
36. See generally Investor FAQs, CORR. CORP. OF AM., http://ir.correctionscorp.
com/phoenix.zhtml?c=l 17983&p=irol-faq (last visited Oct. 12, 2013). CCA had its initial public
offering in October of 1986, issuing 2 million shares at $9.00 per share.
See also Prison Realty Trust, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Dec. 31, 1999), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1070985/0000950144-00-004324.txt. In 1999, CCA's
Tennessee predecessor merged with Prison Realty Trust, a Maryland Real Estate Investment
Trust, to form the current iteration of CCA.
Investor FAQs, CORR. CORP. OF AM., http://ir.correctionscorp.com/phoenix.
zhtml?c=l 17983&p=irol-faq (last visited Oct. 12, 2013). The company initially sought to retain
REIT status to take advantage of tax benefits, but in October 2000 it reorganized into a traditional
C-corporation.
See also Corr. Corp. of Am., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1070985/000119312512459397/d420784dl0q.htm#toc42
0784_9. As of September, 2012, CCA is investigating options to convert back to a REIT and,
pending a favorable ruling from the IRS, hopes to make the conversion in January of 2013.
Alex Panes, Are For-Profit Prisons Ready to Break Out After Reaching New Highs?, THE
MOTLEY FOOL (Sept. 7, 2012), http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2012/09/07/are-for-profit-
prisons-ready-to-break-out-after-r.aspx. CCA projects that the switch would reduce their cost of
capital, facilitate expansion, and attract more shareholders.
37. There are 20 facilities that CCA operates but does not own: Bartlett State Jail, Bay
Correctional Facility, Bradshaw State Jail, Citrus County Detention Facility, Dawson State Jail,
Elizabeth Detention Center, Gracev4lle Correctional Facility, Hardeman County Correctional
Center, Idaho Correctional Center, Lake City Correctional Facility, Lindsey State Jail, Marion
County Jail II, Metro-Davidson County Detention Facility, Moore Haven Correctional Facility,
North Georgia Detention Center, Silverdale Detention Facilities, South Central Correctional
Center, Wilkinson County Correctional Facility, Willacy County State Jail, and Winn Correctional
Center.
38. Corr. Corp. of Am., Quarterly Report (Form I0-Q) at 6. There are 41 facilities for which
CCA is the owner and the operator: Adams County Correctional Center, Bent County Correctional
Facility, Bridgeport Pre-Parole Transfer Facility, California City Correctional Center, Central
Arizona Detention Center, Cibola County Correctional Center, Cimarron Correctional Facility,
Coffee Correctional Facility, Correctional Treatment Facility, Crossroads Correctional Facility,
Crowley County Correctional Facility, Davis Correctional Facility, Eden Detention Center, Eloy
Detention Center, Florence Correctional Center, Houston Processing Center, Jenkins Correctional
Center, Kit Carson Correctional Center, La Palma Correctional Center, Lake Erie Correctional
Institution, Laredo Processing Center, Leavenworth Detention Center, Lee Adjustment Center,
Marion Adjustment Center, McRae Correctional Facility, Mineral-Wells Pre-Parole Transfer
Facility, Nevada Southern Detention Center, New Mexico Women's Correctional Facility, North
Fork Correctional Facility, Northeast Ohio Correctional Center, Red Rock Correctional Facility,
Saguaro Correctional Center, San Diego Correctional Facility, Stewart Detention Center, T. Don
Hutto Residential Center, Tallahatchie County Correctional Facility, Torrance County Detention
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states and the District of Columbia. 39 According to the CCA:
The Company is compensated for operating and managing
facilities at an inmate per diem rate based upon actual or minimum
guaranteed occupancy levels. Occupancy rates for a particular
facility are typically low when first opened or immediately
following an expansion. However, beyond the start-up period,
which typically ranges from 90 to 180 days, the occupancy rate
tends to stabilize. During 2011, the average compensated
occupancy of its facilities, based on rated capacity, was 88.2% for
all of the facilities it owned or managed, exclusive of facilities
where operations have been discontinued. . . As of December 31,
2011, the Company had approximately 12,300 unoccupied beds at
facilities that had availability of 100 or more beds.4 0
In order to understand how CCA and other private prison providers
have adapted to the financial crisis, it is useful to explicate their business
model. Because CCA is compensated based on a price per-inmate-per-bed-
day, CCA monitors a number of per diem values.4' A distinction is made
between the per diems for those facilities which CCA both owns and
operates, and those facilities which it only manages.42 CCA's latest
quarterly disclosure to the SEC compares per diems for June-September
of 2011 and 2012, as well as for the 9-month periods of January-
September of 2011 and 2012. Additionally, CCA's most recent annual
disclosure compares these figures for the fiscal years ending in 2011 and
2012, respectively. 43
Facility, Webb County Detention Center, West Tennessee Detention Facility, Wheeler
Correctional Facility, and Whiteville Correctional Facility.
39. Id. at 8 and 24-25. CCA owns the Community Education Partners, which it also leased
but is currently idle. Diamondback Correctional Facility, Huerfano County Correctional Center,
Otter Creek Correctional Center, Prairie Correctional Facility, Queensgate Correctional Facility,
Shelby Training Center are all also owned by CCA and currently idle. The total number of owned,
managed, and leased facilities is 69. See also Prison Realty Trust, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-
K), supra note 36, at 42. The CCA also owns Leo Chesney Correctional Center, which it leases to
another operator.
40. Stock Profile for Corr. Corp. of Am., REUTERS, http://wwv.reuters.com/
finance/stocks/companyProfile?rpc=66&symbol=CXW (last visited Oct. 12, 2013).
41. Corr. Corp. of Am., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), supra note 36.
42. Id. at 32-33. As the quarterly report explains, per diems are generally higher for owned
and managed facilities because CCA incurs the cost of investment in the facility, repairs, real
estate taxes, insurance, and assumes the risk of continuing to pay these costs even if the
management contract is terminated and the facility sits vacant.
43. Id.; see also Corr. Corp. of Am., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Dec. 31, 2011), available
at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1070985/000119312512081122/d231839dlOk.htm.
The data in the table are pulled from Form 10-Q and Form 10-K.
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06/12- 06/11- 01/12- 01/11- FY FY
09/12 09/11 09/12 09/11 2011 2010
Combined Revenue $59.19 $58.62 $59.16 $58.76 $58.48 $58.36
Per Diem
Averages, Expenses $41.34 $40.51 $41.83 $40.20 $40.15 $40.16
All
Facilities Operating $17.85 $18.11 $17.33 $18.56 $18.33 $18.20
Margin (30.2%) (30.9%) (29.3%) (31.6%) (31.3%) (31.2%)
Owned Revenue $67.25 $66.51 $67.22 $66.54 $66.68 $66.30
and
Managed Expenses $44.06 $42.83 $33.91 $42.50 $42.47 $42.48
Facilities
Operating $23.19 $23.68 $22.77 $24.04 $24.21 $23.82
Margin (34.5%) (35.6%) (33.9%) (36.1%) (36.3%) (35.9%)
Managed Revenue $40.30 $40.70 $40.22 $40.93 $40.39 $39.60
Only
Facilities Expenses $34.98 $35.22 $35.66 $34.93 $35.05 $34.69
Operating $5.32 $5.48 $4.56 $6.00 $5.34 $4.91
Margin (13.2%) (13.5%) (11.3%) (14.7%) (13.2%) (12.4%)
For the nine months ending in September 2012, CCA's net income
was $111.4 million, compared to $122 million for the nine months ending
in September 201 1.44 For the entire year of 2011, CCA's net income was
$162.5 million, compared to $157.2 million in 2010.45
Contributing to the increase in net income for 2011 compared to
the previous year was an increase in operating income of $9.0
million, from $323.1 million during 2010 to $332.1 million during
2011 as a result of an increase in average daily inmate populations
and new management contracts, partially offset by an increase in
general and administrative expenses and depreciation and
amortization.46
The private prison business, complete with construction, new
contracts, and some changes to existing contracts, has continued to trudge
44. Corr. Corp. of Am., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), supra note 36, at 28.
45. Corr. Corp. of Am., Annual Report (Form 10-K), supra note 43, at 46.
46. Id.
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along, to a considerable degree of success, deep into the recession and the
CCA has been particularly fortunate. The quarterly data reveal a continuing
story of growth throughout the local government crisis.
Corrections Corporation of America: Ten-year History of Net Income and
Facility Composition
FY Net Income No. facilities No. Managed No. Leased to
ending Owned and Only Third Party
Dec. 31 Managed Operators
2011 $162,510 46 20 2
2010 $157,193 45 21 2
2009 $154,954 44 21 2
2008 $ 150,941 43 20 3
2007 $133,373 41 24 3
*all information taken from the respective fiscal years' 10-Ks, which can be found at:
http://www.sec.gov/cgibin/browseedgar?company-&match=&CIK=cxw&filenum=&State=
&Country-&SIC=&owner-exclude&Find=Find+Companies&action=getcompany.
CCA continues to do well in other ways. Compensation for its
executives, both in basic compensation and stock options, is impressive, 4 7
47. See generally Corr. Corp. of Am. Executive Compensation, MORNINGSTAR,
http://insiders.morningstar.com/trading/executive-compensation.action?t-CXW (last visited Oct.
12, 2013). Publicly traded companies are required to disclose the amount and type of
compensation paid to the CEO, CFO and the three other highest-compensated officers. For the
fiscal year ending on December 31, 2011, CCA's CEO and President, Damon T. Hininger, was
paid $3,696,798 in basic compensation. Special Assistant to the CEO, Richard P. Seiter, received
the second highest basic compensation package at $1,845,566. Richard P. Seiter, FORBES,
http://www.forbes.com/profile/richard-p-seiter/ John D. Ferguson, Chairman of the Board and
former CEO, was paid $1,734,793 in basic compensation and $1,242,172 in stock options.
Anthony L. Grande, Executive Vice President and Chief Development Officer received
$1,735,039 in basic compensation and $31,550 in stock options. Brian Collins, Executive Vice
President and Chief Human Resources Officer, received $1,505,146 in basic compensation and
$1,000 in stock options. In sum, in 2011, the executive compensation (exclusive of stock options)
of all of the above-listed executive officers totaled $12,352,390 as compared to the previous fiscal
year ending December 31, 2010, when the same officials received total basic compensation of
$10,861,830, 2011 saw a 13.72% increase in executive compensation. See also Corr. Corp. of Am.
Executive Compensation, REUTERS, http://www.reuters.com/finance/stocks/company
Winter 2014] 119
HASTINGS RACE AND POVERTY LAW JOURNAL
and its stock is slightly less risky than the industry average. 4 8 This
continuing success raises the question of how CCA and other prison
providers have adapted to the changes in incarceration nationwide.
A partial answer is in CCA's quarterly and annual SEC filings, which
go into a fair amount of detail about the development of new facilities,
idling of vacant facilities, and changes in customer contracts. The
following is a chronological list of recent major facilities changes.
Date Development
February 2008-March Begin and suspend construction on Trousdale County, TN facility
2009 "until there is greater clarity around the timing of future bed
absorption by its customers." 49
2009-2013 California accounted for 13% of CCA's management revenue in
2010 and 2011, however the implementation of the realignment
program may impact an Intent to Award CCA a contract to house
up to 3,256 additional inmates.50
January 2010 Completion of removal of WA and MN inmates from Prairie
facility due to low occupancy and in-state space. CCA in
negotiations with CA to fill beds.5
March 2010 Completion of removal of AZ inmates due to budgetary concerns
from Huerfano facility in CO and the subsequent idling of that
facility."
May 2010 Completion of removal of AZ inmates due to budgetary concerns
from Diamondback facility in OK and the subsequent idling of that
Officerssymbol=CXW (last visited Oct. 12, 2013) (reporting that CCA's CFO, Todd J.
Mullenger, was paid $1,835,048 in basic compensation, plus $58,201 in stock options).
48. Corr. Corp. of Am. Historical Stock Prices, GOOGLE, https://www.google.
com/finance/historical?q=NYSE%3ACXW&ei=ecg-UpD6G6KeiQKjyQE&start--210&num=30
(last visited Oct. 12, 2013). As of the close of the market on November 9, 2012, CCA Stock
(trading on NYSE under ticker symbol CXW) was trading at $33.67/share. With 100.05 million
shares outstanding, the market cap of CCA (its number of shares outstanding multiplied by price
of share) sits at 3.37 billion dollars. See also CORR. CORP. OF AM., Investor's FAQs, supra note
36. CCA pays a quarterly dividend of $.20/share. CCA's beta, which is a measure of the volatility
of the stock relative to a market average, is .94. See Corr. Corp. of Am. Financial Highlights,
REUTERs, http://www.reuters.com/finance/stocks/financialHighlights?symbol=CXW (last visited
Oct. 12, 2013) (a beta of I means that the stock has average risk. CCA's stock is considered very
slightly less risky than market, but more risky than the "industry average" beta of .74).
49. Corr. Corp. of Am., Annual Report (Form 10-K), supra note 43, at F-16.
50. Id. at 52.
51. Id. at 51.
52. Id.
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Increase in inmate populations at two expanded facilities in GA,
Coffee and Wheeler.54
CCA ceased managing the Gadsden and Hernando County facilities
in FL but commenced managing the Graceville and Moore Haven
facilities in FL, contributing to a management-only revenue
increase of $28.3 million in 2011.55
Completion of Nevada Southern Facility.56
Decrease in FBOP population at California City Facility.57
Renegotiate Elizabeth, NJ contract with ICE. New classification
system for inmates, lower per diems, 95% occupancy guarantee. 5
Contract with BOP to house federal inmates at McRae facility in
GA, reduced margin but 90% occupancy guarantee and long-term
contract up to 10 years.59
Closure of Delta 1,172-bed facility in Mississippi.60
Purchase of Lake Erie Facility from Ohio for 73 million.6'
44 million investment in property for construction of a facility in
San Diego to house federal inmates to replace current San Diego
Facility, which will revert to County of San Diego in 2015.62
New contract with Puerto Rico to manage up to 480 inmates at
Cimarron facility in Oklahoma. 63
53. Corr. Corp. of Am., Annual Report (Form 10-K), supra note 43, at 51.
54. Id. at 47.
55. Id. at 52 and 54.
56. Id. at 47.
57. Id.
58. Corr. Corp. of Am., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), supra note 36, at 37.
59. Id. at 36.
60. Id. at 39.
61. Corr. Corp. of Am., Annual Report (Form 10-K), supra note 43, at F-18.
62. Id.
63. Corr. Corp. of Am., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), supra note 36, at 34.
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July 2012 Contract with Oklahoma expanded to house an additional 340
inmates at two CCA-owned facilities in the state.64
July 2012 New contract with Idaho DOC to house 800 inmates at Kit Carson
facility in Colorado. 65
June-September Renegotiation of lease of North Georgia Detention Center
2012 decreasing CCA's rent. Savings of 1.3 million annually. 66
September 2012 New contract with AZ DOC to house up to 1,000 inmates at Red
Rock facility in AZ. Ramping up to 90% guaranteed occupancy in
2015.
As the list shows, in the last few years CCA has recurred to several
adaptations to the financial crisis:
i. Compromising
Several of the major steps taken by CCA have involved reaching
compromises with old customers about occupancy rates. In some of these
cases, CCA has amended its agreements to reduced margins while
preserving occupancy guarantees and solidifying contract terms. In other
cases, CCA offered to settle for a slightly less packed occupancy rate. The
report for the third quarter of 2012 regarding California's realignment
program is a good example of the forgiving treatment CCA awards one of
its best customersj and is worth reading verbatim:
In November 2010, the State of California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation (the "CDCR") extended the
agreement with us to house up to 9,588 inmates at four of the five
facilities we operated for them. The extension, which is subject to
appropriations by the California legislature, began July 1, 2011
and expires June 30, 2013.




68. See Corr. Corp. of Am., Annual Report (Form 10-K), supra note 43, at 52. Of CCA's
state customers, California is a major contributor. In the years ended in December 31, 2011 and
December 31, 2010, 13% of management revenue came from the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation.
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In May 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a lower court ruling
requiring California to reduce its inmate population to 137.5% of
its then current capacity, or to 110,000 inmates, by May 24, 2013.
As of September 30, 2012, the adult inmate population held in
state of California institutions totaled approximately 120,000
inmates, which did not include the California inmates held in our
out of state facilities. In connection with this ruling, the court set
forth targeted reductions, measured every six months, to inmate
populations held in the 33 facilities located in the state of
Califorma.
In an effort to meet the Federal court ruling, the fiscal year 2012
budget of the state of California called for a significant
reallocation of responsibilities from state government to local
jurisdictions, including housing certain lower level inmates
currently the responsibility of the State. This realignment plan
commenced on October 1, 2011 and has resulted in a reduction in
state inmate populations of approximately 24,000.
As realignment has progressed, the state of California released a
new five-year plan for their projected population and capacity
needs, which envisioned recalling the inmates held in our facilities
over the next several years resulting in an end to our agreement by
June 2016. The plan included many proposed modifications,
including but not limited to, a continued decline in the State's
prison population through implementation of the realignment plan,
an increase in the maximum occupancy of the California
correctional system required by the U.S. Supreme Court from
137.5% to 145%, along with new in-state construction.
In June 2012, we announced an agreement that modified our
existing contract with the CDCR to reduce the total number of
inmates we house for California to an average daily population of
9,038 for the State's fiscal year ending June 30, 2013.
In September 2012, the three-judge panel rejected the State's
proposal to modify the court's order to increase the maximum
occupancy of its correctional system to 145% and instructed the
State to operate at 137.5% of design capacity. In its response to the
Court, the State indicated that a modification to the final
population target will be warranted at an uncertain date in the
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future and that the State would move for a modification again
when such a motion is appropriate. If the 137.5% benchmark is
indeed upheld, the State has acknowledged that alternatives such
as continuing to house inmates out-of-state would have to be
considered.
It is unclear at this time how realignment or the five-year plan may
impact the long-term utilization by the CDCR of our out of state
beds. The return of the California inmates to the state of
California would have a significant adverse impact on our
financial position, results of operations, and cash flows. We
housed approximately 8,700 inmates from the state of California
as of September 30, 2012, compared with approximately 9,500
California inmates as of September 30, 2011. Approximately 12%
and 13% of our management revenue for the nine months ended
September 30, 2012 and 2011, respectively, was generated from
the CDCR.
It is also notable that CCA is not shy, in the face of such compromises,
to assert its goal and how it plans on profiting from California's lack of
foresight: "[W]e expect insufficient bed development by our partners to
result in a return to the supply and demand imbalance that has benefited the
private corrections industry."o
ii. Changing Customers, Diversifying, and Proactive Marketing
Even as CCA is compromising its contract terms with some customers,
it is on the prowl for new ones. As per its prospectus, CCA plans on
incurring capital expenditures "to expand the design capacity of certain of
our facilities (in order to retain management contracts) and to increase our
inmate bed capacity for anticipated demand from current and future
customers."71 The potential to grow is mentioned as well: "We will also
consider opportunities for growth, including potential acquisitions of
businesses within our line of business and those that provide
complementary services, provided we believe such opportunities will
broaden our market share and/or increase the services we can provide to our
customers."72
Indeed, in early 2012, the CCA sent a letter notifying state correctional
officers that it had earmarked $250 million to purchase state prisons in good
69. Corr. Corp. of Am., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), supra note 36, at 35.
70. Id. at 30.
71. Corr. Corp. of Am., Annual Report (Form 10-K), supra note 43, at 63.
72. Id.
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condition and specified as one of the requirements "[a]n assurance by the
agency partner that the agency has sufficient inmate population to maintain
a minimum 90 percent [occupancy] rate over the term of the contract." 7 3
States presented with this business opportunity responded with
preoccupation that compliance with the required occupancy rate would
mean reforming their sentencing laws to make them harsher.74 As the
former Kansas Secretary of Corrections stated, "My concern would be that
our state would be obligated to maintain these (occupancy) rates and subtle
pressure would be applied to make sentencing laws more severe with a clear
intent to drive up the population."7 1
The dwindling state prison market has increased CCA's interest in
other opportunities. One such opportunity is Agecroft Prison Management,
formerly owned by a subsidiary of CCA, which operates a correctional
facility in England.76  In 2011, CCA extended a working capital loan to
Agecroft.n CCA also fully owns and operates TransCor, which provides
transportation services to governmental agencies, and in particular inmate
transport.78 During the years ended December 31, 2009, 2008, and 2007,
TransCor generated total consolidated revenue of $4.0 million, $6.9 million,
and $14.2 million, respectively, comprising 0.2%, 0.4%, and 1.0% of our
total consolidated revenue in each respective year." TransCor has been
linked to various scandals and dysfunctions, including escape attempts and
physical and sexual abuse of inmates by its drivers.o
CCA's reliance on collaborations with federal customers is particularly
important, as the federal government's share in its profits has risen in recent
years.8 This market includes not only the Bureau of Prisons and the US
73. Letter from Harley Lappin, Chief Corr. Officer, Corr. Corp. of Amer., http://big.assets.
huffingtonpost.com/ccaletter.pdf; see also Chris Kirkham, Private Prison Corporation Offers
Cash in Exchange for State Prisons, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 14, 2012),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/14/private-prisons-buying-stateprisons.n_1272143.html;
see also Dina Rasor, America's Top Prison Corporation: A Study in Predatory Capitalism and
Cronyism, TRUTHOUT (May 3, 2012), http://truth-out.org/news/item/8875-corrections-
corporation-of-america-a-study-in-predatory-capitalism-and-cronyism.
74. Kevin Johnson, Private Purchasing of Prisons Locks Occupancy Rates, USA TODAY
(Mar. 8, 2012), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-03-01/buying-prisons-
require-high-occupancy/53402894/1.
75. Id. .
76. Corr. Corp. of Am., Annual Report (Form 10-K), supra note 43, at F-12.
77. Id. at F-19.
78. Id. at 7.
79. Id.
80. ALEX FRIEDMANN, For-Profit Transportation Companies: Taking the Prisoners and the
Public for a Ride, in PRISON PROFITEERS: WHO MAKES MONEY FROM MASS INCARCERATION
270-274 (Tara Herivel & Paul Wright eds., The New Press, 2009).
81. See Corr. Corp. of Am., Annual Report (Form 10-K), supra note 43, at 48. Federal
revenues increased $31.5 million, or 4.4% from $717.8 million in 2010 to $749.3 million in 2011,
comprising 43% of CCA's total revenue for both of the years ended December 31, 2011 and 2010.
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Marshals Service, but the increasing imprisonment needs of Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE). 82 Detention services for undocumented
immigrants are perceived as an emerging demand that can offset losses and
setbacks resulting from the recession, the prison closures, and
decarcerations in state corrections. 8 3 Immigration reform is perceived as
threatening business, 84 which, according to CCA's annual report, "could
affect the number of persons arrested, convicted, and sentenced, thereby
potentially reducing demand for correctional facilities to house them."85
Indeed, a growing share of the private prison market consists of
privatized detention centers. Nearly half of all detained undocumented
immigrants are housed in private facilities.86 CCA, the largest contractor
with ICE, operates a total of fifteen ICE-contracted facilities with a total of
5,800 beds.87  The Geo Group, Inc. (GEO) is not far behind with and
operates seven facilities with a total of 7,183 beds. Moreover, in
December 2010, GEO purchased B.I. Incorporated, a company that has
lucrative government contracts with ICE is the sole administrator of ICE's
alternatives to detention program. 89  The way the CCA and the private
prison industry manage to not only find and exploit these opportunities, but
also actively create them, is discussed below.
iii. Staying Afloat Politically
CCA exerts political influence by making donations independently and
through its multiple political action committees, the "CCA," "Corrections
See also Corr. Corp. of Am., Annual Report (Form 10-Q), supra note 36, at 30. Federal
customers also generated approximately 42% of CCA's total revenue for the three months ended
September 30, 2012, and 44% for the same period in 20tt, increasing $0.4 million, from $188.4
million during the three months ended September 30, 2011, to $188.9 million during the three
months ended September 30, 2012.
82. Corr. Corp. of Am., Annual Report (Form 10-Q), supra note 36, at 30.
83. Angelo Young, Top Private Prison Operators Geo, Corrections Corp OfAmerica Worry




85. Corr. Corp. of Am., Annual Report (Form 10-K), supra note 43, at 26. See also The Geo
Grp., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 33 (Jan. 2, 2011) (showing similar statements in GEO's
annual report, indicating that this is an industry trend).
86. Garance Burke & Laura Wides-Munoz, Immigrants Prove Big Business for Prison
Companies, YAHOO! NEWS (Aug. 2, 2012), http://news.yahoo.com/immigrants-prove-big-busines
s-prison-companies-084353195.html.
87. The Math of Immigration Detention: Runaway Costs for Immigration Detention Do Not





Corporation of America," and "America's Leader in Partnership
Corrections."90 Between 2003 and 2012, CCA contributed $2,161,004 to
political campaigns and ballot measures. 9' Of that 2.1 million, 1.3 million
(60.4%) went to Republican candidates, $650,330 (30.1%) went to
Democratic candidates, $1,500 went to third-party or "other" candidates,
and $203,500 (9.4%) was donated to influence ballot measures.92
By state, California received the greatest amount of those
contributions, at $715,350, followed by Florida at $478,494, Georgia at
$285,000, and CCA's home state of Tennessee at $126,500.93 The
$203,500 spent on ballot measures went to seven different ballot
committees, including three in California. 94 Of the California contributions,
in 2009, $100,000 went to Budget Reform Now, a committee that supported
a slew of budgetary propositions, in 2012, $50,000 went to support
California's Proposition 30, the successful effort to raise taxes to fund
public education, and in 2008, $1,000 went to the Yes on 6 Committee to
Take Back our Neighborhoods.9 ' Furthermore, CCA contributed a grand
total of $1,858,094 to 239 different lobbyists between 2003 and 2011.96
Again, California took the biggest slice of the pie with the most lobbyists at
16 and the highest contribution total at $532,950.9'
Given CCA's emerging interest in detention of undocumented
immigrants, a market the industry perceives as a way to offset losses from
recession-era corrections, it is particularly important to point out its role in
shaping immigration policy. In April 2010, Arizona passed SB 1070,
otherwise known as the Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe
Neighborhoods Act.98 SB 1070 allowed state law enforcement officials to
profile possible undocumented immigrants during regular contact with
community members and made traveling without documentation a state
offense. 99  Later, in Arizona v. United States,'00 the Supreme Court
90. Noteworthy Contributor Summary for Corr. Corp. of Am., NAT'L INST. ON MONEY IN
STATE POLITICS, http://www.followthemoney.org/database/topcontributor.phtml?u=695&y=0
(last visited on Oct. 13, 2013).
91. Id.




96. Lobbyist Client Summary for Corr. Corp. of Am., NAT'L INST. ON MONEY IN STATE
POLITICS, http://www.followthemoney.org/databasellobbyistclient.phtml?lc=100552&y-0&s=CA
#CA (last visited on Oct. 13, 2013). It appeared to me that the 1.8 million in lobbying
contributions was separate from the 2.1 million in political contributions, but that issue warrants a
second look.
97. Id.
98. S. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010).
99. Id.
100. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2494 (2012).
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invalidated portions of the law on federal preemption grounds, but upheld
the portion which allowed Arizona state police to investigate the
immigration status of an individual stopped, detained, or arrested if there is
reasonable suspicion that individual is in the country illegally.' 01
SB 1070 passed, in great part, due to the lobbying efforts and
monetary contributions of private prison providers. 102 CCA, a member of
the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), along with other
powerful corporate actors, hoped to make SB 1070 into a model piece of
legislation to be reproduced nationwide. o3 As reported by NPR, when the
bill was introduced on the floor, it received an unprecedented support by 36
co-sponsors, two-thirds of whom either attended a preliminary planning
meeting with ALEC or were ALEC members. 0 "That same week, the
Corrections Corporation of America hired a powerful new lobbyist to work
the capitol ... thirty of the 36 co-sponsors received donations over the next
six months, from prison lobbyists or prison companies-Corrections
Corporation of America, Management and Training Corporation and The
Geo Group."' 05
The private prison industry's lobbying strategy is not dissimilar to the
tactics employed by the California Corrections and Peace Officer
Association (CCPOA), the powerful prison guard union that has played
such a key role in creating California's punitive legal landscape.' 06 While
clearly invested in the structure of mass incarceration, CCPOA has donated
to Republican and Democrat candidates alike and targets special
involvement legal propositions that advance their interests. 07 This method
of hedging bets has allowed both CCA and CCPOA to remain afloat
politically and continue to profit.
B. Trouble in the Land of Capitalism
i. The Intangible Costs in Human Rights
It is by now a clich6 in private prison scholarship to argue the obvious:
101. Adam Liptak, Blocking Parts of Arizona Law, Justices Allow Its Centerpiece, N.Y.
TIMES (June 25, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/26/us/supreme-court-rejects-part-of-
arizona-immigration-law.html?_r-2&hp&.






106. See e.g., JOSHUA PAGE, THE TOUGHEST BEAT: POLITICS, PUNISHMENT, AND THE
PRISON OFFICERS UNION IN CALIFORNIA (Oxford Univ. Press 2011).
107. Id.
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a goal of economic profit is fundamentally at odds with any sort of
rehabilitative focus. Several recession-era incidents show, in alarming
ways, the ills stemming from the co-dependency between private prison
companies and financially-strained state governments.
In a telling microcosm of the standards pervasive in private prisons
across the nation, the country's first privately owned prison, the Corrections
Corporation of Ohio-run as Ohio Correctional Facility, came under heat in
early October 2012 after an audit report by the Ohio Department of
Rehabilitation and Correction cited the CCA for 47 violations of state
prison standards.' 08 The audit also found that the CCA was in compliance
with only "66.7 percent of the state's standards." 09
The history of abuse in Ohio's private prison began in 1997, when
Corrections Corporation of America opened a private prison in
economically downtrodden Youngstown, Ohio." 0 CCA rushed to staff the
prison "with inexperienced guards and then received 1,700 inmates-most
charged with violent crimes-transferred from Washington, D.C., to the
private prison. Within a year, 20 prisoners were stabbed and two were
murdered. Six escaped.""' Following ubiquitous public outcry and
negative media coverage, CCA was forced to close the prison once it
became clear that the standards it was expected to hold its prison to would
not prove profitable.112
In an act of collective amnesia, elected officials made a 2011 deal with
CCA to "become the first state to sell a state-owned prison to a private
company."' 13 Far from being hesitant to do business with the company
responsible for the disastrous Youngstown incident, the Ohio legislature
"proudly touted the sale for its potential taxpayer savings."ll 4 The financial
and legal implications of this Faustian bargain were atrocious. The benefit
of using a private prison company was soon mitigated by the realization
that the corporations (CCA?) did not want to hold high-risk inmates
because it would require greater overhead costs for security and
healthcare." 5 Therefore, the (corporations) had an incentive to overcrowd
108. Leigh Owens, Private Prison In Violation ofOhio State Law, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 10,
2012), http://www.huffingtonpostcom/2012/10/09/private-prison-violates-state-lawn_1951917.html.
109. Id.
110. German Lopez, Liberty for Sale: Should Ohio Inmates be Commodities in a For-Profit






115. ACLU OF OHIO, PRISONS FOR PROFIT: A LOOK AT PRISON PRIVATIZATION 14 (Apr. 2011),
available at http://www.acluohio.org/assets/issues/Criminaliustice/PrisonsForProfit201 l04.pdf.
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the institution with low-risk offenders." 6 The result was constant pressure
on the state regarding sentencing policies and occupancy."l 7 Even with less
serious offenders, "private prisons had a 50 percent higher incidence of
inmate-on-staff assaults and two-thirds higher incidence of inmate-on-
inmate assaults than state-run prisons."" 8 Furthermore, "the private prison
industry's own statistics show[ed] that at private prisons the turn-over rate
was 53 percent, while at public prisons it was a mere 16 percent."
1 9
A variation on this theme is incarceration in Louisiana. The state
houses more inmates per capita than any other state in the U.S.12 0
Louisiana presents a particularly bleak case study of the devastating impact
of prison privatization on the criminal justice system. Most of the state's
inmates are housed in for-profit facilities.12 1  While a number of states
increasingly rely on private prisons to house their inmates, Louisiana's
prisons' infrastructure is notable for the fact that "most prison entrepreneurs
are rural sheriffs, who hold tremendous sway in remote parishes." 22 The
practical effect of this is that, "if the inmate count dips, sheriffs bleed
money. Their constituents lose jobs. The prison lobby ensures this does
not happen by thwarting nearly every reform that could result in fewer
people behind bars." 2 3  On the heels of pervasive reports regarding
deplorable conditions in corporate-run prisons, there appear to be signs that
a backlash may be on the horizon.
The recent closure of a private prison in rural Kentucky highlights the
tension between state economic needs, and a lack of oversight and quality
regulation in the private prison system.124 Otter Creek Correctional Center
in Wheelwright, Kentucky had its state funding pulled in August of 2012
after Hawaii removed all 168 female inmates it had housed at the facility
due to allegations of sexual abuse by prison guards.125 Despite the alleged
116. PRISONS FOR PROFIT, supra note 115.
117. Id.
118. ACLU OF OHIO, supra note 115 at 13.
119. Id. A higher turnover rate implies less-knowledgeable staff and decreased stability.
120. Cindy Chang, Louisiana is the World's Prison Capital, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (May 13,
2012), http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2012/05/louisiana is theworlds-prison.html. One
in every 86 Louisiana adults is in prison, twice the national average. Charles M. Blow,
Plantations, Prisons and Profits, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/05/26/opinion/blow-plantations-prisons-and-profits.html?_r-1 &. Louisiana has the highest
percentage of inmates serving life without parole, spends more on local inmates than any other




124. Brett Barrouquere, Rural Ky. Town Readies For Private Prison Closure, Fox NEWS
(Apr. 24, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2012/04/24/rural-ky-town-readies-for-private-prison
-closure/. Other aspects of Hawaii's choice to house its inmates out of states are discussed below.
125. Id.
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abuses that led to Otter Creek being shut down, "because Eastern Kentucky
is one of the poorest rural regions in the country, the prison was welcomed
by local residents desperate for jobs."1 26 Historically, Wheelwright was a
company town founded by a coal company in 1916 and saw its economy
grind to a halt as coal production slowed.12 7 However, the Otter Creek
Correctional Facility "brought nearly 200 jobs to one of the poorest regions
in the South when it opened in 1981. CCA paid employees $8.25 an
hour-low pay by prison standards but welcome cash for the area." 28 This
relationship between CCA and Wheelwright highlights one of the dangers
of private prisons being run in impoverished areas.129 These types of areas
often rely on the prisons for a much-needed economic boost and there tends
to be a lack of rigor in the oversight of the prisons' management and
maintenance.130
In another egregious instance of private prisons run amok, GEO
removed its presence entirely from Mississippi in April 2012, after Federal
Judge Carlton Reeves wrote that GEO, which ran the Walnut Grove Youth
Correctional Facility had "allowed a cesspool of unconstitutional and
inhuman acts and conditions to germinate, the sum of which places the
offenders at substantial and ongoing risk."' 3 ' A scathing report by the
Department of Justice found that, among other practices at the 1,450 bed
prison housing "inmates ages 13 to 22 who are minors convicted as adults,"
that prison staff routinely had sex with underage inmates, "poorly-trained
guards brutally beat youth and used excessive pepper spray," prison guards
turned a blind eye to inmates possessing homemade knives that were used
in "gang fights and inmate rapes," and perhaps most shockingly, that some
guards themselves were members of gangs.' 32
The corporate profit motive that is increasingly permeating the prison
system affects more than just the well-being of prisoners in privately run
126. Ian Urbina, Hawaii to Remove Inmates Over Abuse Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26,
2009, at A12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/26/us/26kentucky.html?_r-0.
127. Hawaii to Remove Inmates, supra note 126.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. For more on private prison providers' promises to improve the economy of prospective
prison towns, see e.g., RUTH WILSON GILMORE, GOLDEN GULAG: PRISONS, SURPLUS, CRISIS,
AND OPPOSITION IN GLOBALIZING CALIFORNIA (2007). See also Clayton Mosher, Gregory
Hooks & Peter B. Hood, Don't Build It Here: The Hype Versus the Reality of Prisons and Local
Employment, in PRISON PROFITEERS: WHO MAKES MONEY FROM MASS INCARCERATION 90-98
(Tara Herivel & Paul Wright eds., The New Press, 2009). An economic analysis of before-and-
after economic conditions suggests that such towns end up not benefitting from the prison industry
as promised, because locals are seldom hired to work in the prisons, and staff chooses to live
elsewhere.
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facilities. Additionally, the emergence of private probation outfits has led
to allegations that probationary decision-making has shifted from ostensibly
neutral courts to for-profit corporations looking to reap financial gain by
using probation as a tool to fine and fee cash-strapped individuals.' 33 A
class action lawsuit pending in Alabama claims that the privately run
Judicial Correction Services (JCS) using for its own financial gain a
probation system run amok.134 Under the preexisting system in towns such
as Childersburg, Alabama, people unable to pay fines imposed by the town
for violations such as speeding are routinely placed on probation.' 35 Once
placed on probation, JCS is tasked with aggressively collecting fines against
these individuals. 36 Rather than charge public authorities for their services,
companies like JCS work for municipalities for free and turn a profit by
attaching fees to a defendants' bills.' 37 This emerging paradigm "is about
the mushrooming of fines and fees levied by money-starved towns across
the country and for-profit businesses that administer the system. The result
is that growing numbers of poor people ... are ending up in jail and in debt
for minor infractions."' 38
ii. Is it really worth it?
The risks and cautionary tales about private prisons raise the question
whether recession-era local governments benefit, from privatizing their
correctional systems in the bottom line. While the benefits of the private
prison industry obviously outweigh the costs for the providers themselves,
it is more difficult to determine whether, from the perspective of state and
local governments, private institutions are truly more economically viable
than their public counterparts. In a comparative study of prison assessment,
Gerry Gaes found that different organizations came to different conclusions
about the cost/performance equation of private and public prisons.139
Specifically, he found differences between the way ABT Associates and the
Bureau of Prisons assessed Taft, a private prison, in comparison to public
institutions.140 The significant differences in assessing per diem costs per
133. Mike Oliver, Private Probation Outfits Raise Eyebrows Over Profit Seeking, ALABAMA





138. Ethan Bronner, Poor Land in Jail as Companies add Huge Fees for Probation, N.Y.
TIMES (July 2, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/03/us/probation-fees-multiply-as-
companies-profit.html?pagewanted=all.
139. Gerry Gaes, Cost Performance Studies Look at Prison Privatization, 259 NAT'L INST.
OF JUST. J. 32, 33 (2008), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/221507.pdf.
140. Id.
132 [Vol. 11I
inmate were due to discrepancies in population sizes (private prisons with
more inmates per year benefit from economies of scale, and any comparison
between them and less-populated state prisons require adjusting the analysis
to account for the difference) and in assessing overhead costs
(governmental contribution may exceed the reported overhead).14 1
One more important consideration is that private and public prisons'
performances are assessed in different ways: Private prisons tend to be
measured in terms of compliance with contract terms, whereas public
prisons' performances are measured based on parameters established by
auditors,14 2 which becomes even more complicated considering that
contract terms between private prisons and the government often differ on a
contract-to-contract basis. Additionally, the definitions of misconduct may
differ from assessor to assessor; for example, while research groups
included two escapes that had occurred at Taft, while the Bureau of Prisons
only noted a situation in which 1,000 inmates had refused to return to their
cells by curfew.143
Another factor complicating the ability to compare private and public
prisons is that their starting points, in terms of population type, are
frequently different. A 2004 study found that "state-run prisons are
generally left to take on a disproportionate number of expensive and high-
risk inmates. For example, inmates with minimum or medium levels of
security classification made up 90 percent of the private sector's population,
compared with only 69 percent in the public sector." 44 The comparison is
problematic under these conditions.
The adaptation strategies of private prison providers are a grim
reminder that correctional developments motivated by financial prudence
do not always lead away from punitivism, but they are not the only such
development. We now turn to another marker of correctional austerity:
Charging the inmates for their custodial experience.
II. The Inmates As Consumers: Rolling Incarceration Costs
Onto Inmates
Yelp, a popular website featuring reviews of restaurants, businesses,
and venues, also offers reviews of some less-expected institutions. San
141. Cost Performance Studies, supra note 139, at 34.
142. Id. at 35. This "internal yardstick" is reminiscent of Feeley and Simon's comment in
The New Penology about how actuarial justice is based on internal measures, such as number of
escapes, rather than on external, utilitarian goals like recidivism reduction. See Malcom M.
Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy of Corrections
and its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449 (1992).
143. Id. at 36.
144. Mason, supra note 25, at 8, citing Curtis R. Blakely & Vic W. Bumphus, Private and
Public Sector Prisons, 68(1) FED. PROBATION 27 (2004).
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Quentin State Prison, the recipient of three stars on Yelp, 145 was reviewed
thusly:
I really wanted to love this place. I heard that the kitchen used
local farms and put great thought in to their seasonally changing
menu and the service was not exactly friendly but 'efficient.' Boy
was I wrong . .. It was pretty busy, but I was able to find a table.
Again, I understand this is buffet style, but when I asked the
gentleman by the front door near where I was sitting if I could sit
further from the door he was SUPER RUDE about it. He just
motioned for me to sit back down, but at least the front door led to
a hallway and not the outside, so although it was raining, I figured
I'd be fine. 146
Similarly, the Los Angeles County Jail received the following
questionable endorsement:
A Hotel for criminals and the like! Stay for free and enjoy
complimentary breakfast, lunch AND dinner! While you are
sharing space with other criminals, you can still enjoy your stay
even more with indefinite alone time, reading material such as La
Opinion, and if you are lucky, a 22in LCD TV might just be
working that day!
You also get complimentary alarm clock service, laundry (no dry
clean), medical and psychological services, and 24 hour protection
from correctional officers and sheriff deputies. Smiley faces all
around =)
The concept of prison services being reviewed for quality by inmates
themselves seems less ludicrous if one considers the increasing tendency to
think of them as consumers. One of the markers of the cost-centered
correctional discourse is a shift away from regarding inmates as wards of a
parens patria state, that is under obligation to provide them with all their
needs during the period of incarceration, and toward viewing them as
service consumers who take up precious resources and should carry their
145. San Quentin State Prison, YELP, http://www.yelp.com/biz/san-quentin-state-prison-san-
quentin (last visited Oct. 14, 2013).
146. Dylan D., Review of San Quentin State Prison, YELP (Feb. 13, 2013),
http://www.yelp.com/biz/san-quentin-state-prison-sanquentin #hrid:hgDF7mYIwl4DbFMhZOBkA.
147. Long T., Review of L.A. County Jail, YELP (Aug. 22, 2012), http://www.yelp.
com/biz/l-a-county-jail-los-angeles-2#hrid:uJAUUPpG5q6it3CCXD5MA.
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own weight. It is little wonder that inmates feel entitled to review services
they increasingly have to pay for.
The idea of "pay to stay" existed long before the recession. Kirsten
Livingston's 2007 survey of such practices reveals that the criminal justice
system was already levying costs on inmates, including payments for victim
compensation, court security, and probation fees as early as the late
1980S.148 In the early 2000s, we saw the introduction of new fees, such as
fees for electronic monitoring, sex offender registration, and, shockingly,
room and board, as well as an increase in existing fees.14 9 Inmates were
saddled with a variety of fees and the costs of their diversion programs, and
Livingston mentions cases of inmates doing time for debts incurred to the
criminal justice system. 50 These problematic aspects of "pay as you stay"
have become worse in the recession. Fueled by panic about the impact of
the California Realignment on local jails, Riverside Jail and other county
institutions are recurring to room-and-board fees to the tune of $140 per
night to cover the expected costs from the addition to their population. 151
Cost-rolling programs are ostensibly geared toward properly
compensating victims, teaching inmates moral lessons and fiscal
responsibility, and to avoid raising taxes; but, as Livingston points out,
those goals have remained elusive. 152 A recent New York State Bar survey
found that 80% of all criminal defendants charged with a felony in the
United States are indigent.15 3 People of color are also overrepresented in
the inmate population.154 The implication is that court-imposed debt adds a
layer of disadvantage unto the shoulders of already-disadvantaged
populations.155 Moreover, inmates who leave the correctional system with
liens for jail rooms and board clearly face obstacles to rehabilitation that do
not favorably impact their recidivism risks.'56
Beyond these utilitarian issues, "pay to stay" policies raise serious
questions of fairness. Clearly, entering a correctional facility is not
148. Kirsten Livingston, Making the "Bad Guy " Pay: Growing Use of Cost Shifting as an
Economic Sanction, in PRISON PROFITEERS: WHO MAKES MONEY FROM MASS INCARCERATION
60-62 (Tara Herivel & Paul Wright eds., The New Press, 2009).
149. Kim Buchanan, It Could Happen to 'You': Pay-to-Stay Jail Upgrades, 106 MICH. L.
REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 60, 61 (2007), available at http://www.michiganiawreview.org/n
articles/it-could-happen-to-you-pay-to-stay-jail-upgrades.
150. Livingston, supra note 148.
151. Jennifer Medina, In Calfornia, a Plan to Charge Inmates for their Stay, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 11, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/12/us/in-riverside-california-a-plan-to-charge-
inmates.html?_r-l&adxnnl=1&src=ISMRAPLILSTFB&adxnnlx=1378062950u2fNHQbzYx
IpZoxQyE/nfA (last visited Sept. 1, 2013).
152. Livingston, supra note 148, at 53.
153. Id. at 56.
154. Id. at 57.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 55.
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tantamount to voluntary consumption of products and services, and
charging astronomical fees for the experience is akin to punishing one twice
for the same offense ("you will pay by enduring incarceration, and by
paying for enduring incarceration"). While taxpayers may feel that it is
unfair for them to shoulder the costs of someone else's wrongdoing, it is
just as unfair to levy those costs against people who are not incurring them
voluntarily. Moreover, a population already disenfranchised, by class
proxies and by felon status, does not have a real say in the costs being
levied, which makes the "inmate as consumer" metaphor even more absurd.
The absurdity is compounded by the terminology accompanying the
inmate-as-customer metaphor. Robert Weisberg, reporting on the Santa
Ana jail's "pay as you stay" brochure, wryly comments:
[the brochure] tells us that the jail "is pleased to host a full range
of alternatives to traditional incarceration"; it reassures prospective
"clients" seeking flexible work/jail schedules ("Work on Saturday
or Sunday? No problem, your weekend days are our weekend
days."); it guarantees "24-hour on-site medical staff'; it
accommodates inmates near and far ("We have helped clients with
sentences from other counties as well as other states."); and it
generally brags that the jail "is the most modem and comfortable
facility in the region," where, A la Cheers, "Each of our clients has
a name . . ."
Surely this manifestation of pay-to-stay is embarrassing. But, as so
honestly represented, pay-to-stay could prove salutary for the
criminal justice system if recognized as part of our somewhat
ritualized cycle of constructive self-embarrassment over the role of
wealth in criminal justice. More specifically, pay-to-stay could
become one of those occasional eruptions of transparency about
the forms of currency exchanged in the market for punishment.'
Unfortunately, Weisberg's hope that the absurdity will expose the
embarrassment seems misplaced. The serious concerns arising from pay-
to-stay policies regarding fairness, proportionality, and disenfranchisement,
have been lost in translation when inmates have attempted to argue their
unconstitutionality in courts. A variety of constitutional challenges were
157. Robert Weisberg, Pay-to-Stay in Cahfornia Jails and the Value of Systemic Self-
Embarrassment 106 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 55 (2007) available at
http://www.michiganlawreview.org/articles/pay-to-stay-in-califomia-jails-and-the-value-of-systemic-
self-embarassment (last visited Oct. 14, 2013).
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raised in federal courts and all of them have been rejected.'58  Only
recently, Tennessee commissioners have approved pay-to-stay regimes in
jails, finding no constitutional violation.15 9
The most recent manifestation of the inmate-as-customer mindset is
the creation of experiential tiers in prison and explicitly charging inmates
more for comfort. The Fremont Police Department recently announced its
intention to offer inmates a "pay-to-stay" option.' 60 For a one-time fee of
$45, and a "hotel payment" of $155.per night,
... prisoners serving short sentences on lesser charges can stay in
a smaller facility while avoiding county jails.
"It's still a jail; there's no special treatment," Lt. Mark Devine, a
Fremont police official who oversees the program, told Chris De
Benedetti of the Argus. "They get the same cot, blanket and food
as anybody in the county jail, except that our jail is smaller, quieter
and away from the county jail population. 161
The notion of creating tiers of comfort in prison, and allowing inmates
to upgrade their prison experience as if they were airfare ticket purchasers,
offends not only the notion of state responsibility but that of equality before
the law. Of course, it is inevitable that some inmates' incarceration
experience is more pleasant than others'. However, state sanctioning of
such tiered experiences is intolerable. It also has serious implications for
race and class differentiation. It is one more example of the "inmate as
consumer" perception run amok.
158. See e.g., Tillman v. Lebanon County Correctional Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 416 (3d Cir.
2000) (arguing excessive fines, cruel and unusual punishment, and even equal protection, as
another inmate was not saddled with his incarceration costs). See also Joshua Michtom, Making
Prisoners Pay for Their Stay: How a Popular Correctional Program Violates the Ex Post Facto
Clause, 13 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 187 (2004), available at http://www.bu.edu/law/central/id/
organizations/journals/pilj/voll3no2/documents/13-2MichtomNote.pdf (some advocate using an
ex post facto argument, but the argument was not raised in Tillman).
159. Lauren Brooke-Eisen, Tennessee Inmates Must 'Pay-to-Stay', BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUST. (Aug. 28, 2013), http://www.brennancenter.org/blog/tennessee-inmates-pay-stay (last
visited Sept. 1, 2013).
160. California Prison's 'Pay-To-Stay' Option Offers 'Quieter' Rooms For $155 A Day,
THE HUFFINGTON POST (Jul. 28, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/28/califomia-
prison-pay-to-stay-n_3667573.html.
161. Id.
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III. Prison Closures: Crowding, Repurposing, and Beds for
Sale
Another impact of the financial crisis has been a trend of prison
closures.
In 2011, 13 states were closing prisons or in the process of it.
Michigan has now closed 22 facilities since 2002. New York State
Governor Andrew Cuomo announced plans last year to close
seven. And legislators in Texas-a state that had tripled its prison
capacity since the late '80's-recently opted to close the 102-year-
old Sugar Land prison.162
A 2011 report by The Sentencing Project elaborates on the recent
incidences of prison closures, noting that Michigan's prison closures are
due predominantly to reform in the areas of sentencing and parole.16 3 A
December 2012 follow-up report on The Sentencing Project's 2011 findings
uncovered that in addition to the 13 states that reported prison closures in
2011, "In 2012, at least six states have closed 20 prison institutions or are
contemplating doing so, potentially reducing prison capacity by over 14,100
beds and resulting in an estimated $337 million in savings."'6" Particularly,
"[d]uring 2012, Florida led the nation in prison closings with its closure of
10 correctional facilities; the state's estimated cost savings for prison
closings totals over $65 million."' 65
One conundrum that states have faced over the past several years is
that, "while funds to manage expensive prison systems have lessened, so
too have resources for services such as treatment for substance abuse and
mental health."' 66 At the same time, as of 2011, The National Conference
of State Legislatures found that "corrections and public safety spending
were above budgeted levels in seven states, including Alaska, where
corrections spending exceed the state's $258 million corrections budget by
$9 million."'6 7 Compounding the problem of corrections overspending is
162. Emily Badger, America Is Finally Closing Prisons. Now What Do We Do With Them?,
THE ATLANTIC CITIES (Dec. 6, 2012), http://www.theatlanticcities.com/design/2012/12/america-
finally-closing-prisons-now-what-do-them/4083/#.
163. Nicole D. Porter, On the Chopping Block 2012: State Prison Closings, THE SENT'G









the fact that many government jobs hinge on a robust corrections
infrastructure.16 8  Michigan provides a case in point, where the prison
population has significantly declined, but "state lawmakers are still
continuing work to contain costs where one out of three state employees
works in the criminal justice system and the corrections budget represents
23% of state general funds."' 6 9
But are prison closures merely a reflection of budget shortages, or do
they represent a bigger ideological shift? In assessing potential causes of
prison closures, Adam Gelb, director of the Public Safety Performance
Project with the Pew Center on the states, dismisses the notion that the
recent rash of prison closures is entirely driven by dwindling state budgets
and economic concerns. 170 Rather, Gelb suggests that there has been an
ideological shift "by the public, politicians and public safety professionals,
with the result that we may be entering a new phase of America's complex
relationship to incarceration, one in which we now have to figure out what
to do with all these empty, peculiar and often isolated buildings."17 ' Gelb
attributes this shift in thinking to public safety professionals learning:
[m]uch more than they knew 35 years ago about how to keep
people from re-offending, and they have better tools to manage
offenders without using prison cells (better treatment programs,
GPS tracking devices, alcohol detection ignition locks in cars).
The public has also grown weary of the War on Drugs that helped
fuel or prison boom. Last month, Colorado and Washington voted
to legalize marijuana. And California voters passed a referendum
de-fanging the states "three strikes" law. Even political antipodes
from Newt Gingrich to the ACLU have been jointly backing
prison reform. 17 1
In what appears to be an ideological shift, both the federal and state
governments have refocused their efforts away from keeping prisons full
and more towards reducing recidivism. A recent editorial in the New York
Times suggests that this shift is partially due to the Second Chance Act of
2008, which aims to assist states in reducing recidivism. 7 3 By honing in on
reducing recidivism rates, state governments aim to both decrease crime as
168. Porter, supra note 163, at 4.
169. Id.
170. Badger, supra note 162.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Editorial, How to Cut Prison Costs, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/11/1 1/opinion/sunday/how-to-cut-prison-costs.html.
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well as cut prison costs. New York in particular, now has "a glut of vacant
correctional facilities because of lower crime rates, new programs that
allow early release for nonviolent offenders, and the dismantling of its strict
drug laws."1 74 Following predecessor Governor David Paterson's lead in
closing three prisons during his tenure, current New York Governor
Andrew Cuomo announced that, "prisons were 'not an employment
program,' and proceeded to shut seven of the state's remaining 67
correctional facilities, removing 3,800 beds."17' This trend is a sharp
departure from previous prison policy in the state. As with many recent
prison reforms, the shift towards closing prisons can be largely attributed to
a change in the state's view of drug sentencing. Particularly, "[a]fter New
York adopted mandatory drug sentences in 1973, the state's prison
population soared from 13,437 to a peak of 71, 472 in 1999, prompting a
boom in prison construction."1 7 6  However, "since then, the number of
inmates in state facilities has fallen nearly a quarter, to about 55,000,
leaving thousands of empty beds."177
Part of the driving force behind the trend in prison closures is
sentencing reform. In recent years,
[1]awmakers in Kansas, Michigan, New Jersey, and New York
enacted a mix of administrative and legislative policies that
contributed to sustained prison population reductions of 5-20%. In
each of these states a range of policy changes were adopted,
including sentencing reforms, alternatives for "prison bound"
people, reducing time served in prison, addressing parole release
rates, and reducing revocations. The ability of these four states to
control prison growth shows that policymakers and practitioners
can collaborate to reduce the reliance on incarceration while
maintaining public safety. 178
As public safety and corrections officials have come to realize that
keeping prisons full has been ineffective in deterring "drug market
participation," steps have been taken to pursue policy changes that focus on
rehabilitation and treatment in tandem with reducing the number of people
in jails.'79 In 2012, Missouri
174. Thomas Kaplan, New York Has Some Prisons to Sell You, N.Y. TIMES (May 27, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/28/nyregion/closed-new-york-prisons-prove-hard-to-sell.html.
175. Id.
176. New York Has Some Prisons, supra note 174.
177. Id.
178. Porter, supra note 166 at 2.
179. Id. at 3.
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[p]olicymakers reduced national the nation's most severe
sentencing disparity for crack and powder cocaine when they
changed the drug quantities that triggered a mandatory minimum
prison sentence. Louisiana lawmakers authorized judges to depart
from statutory penalties for certain persons who cooperate with
law enforcement officials.s 0
The table below illustrates a breakdown of the projected prison
closures in 2012. As the data shows, many of the institutions that are being
closed or under consideration are located in Southern states, typically
regarded as more punitive.'
States Closing or Considering Closing Correctional Facilities in 2012
State Correctional Facility Operational Est. First Year Savings
Capacity
California California Rehabilitation 3,900 beds $160, 000, 000
Center
Colorado Colorado State Penitentiary II 316 beds $4,500,000
Florida Broward Correctional 611 beds $2,523, 371
Institution
Florida Caryville Work Camp 133 beds $1,728, 792
Florida Demily Correctional 342 beds $6,068,260
Institution
180. Porter, supra note 166 at 3.
181. For more on the heritage of punitiveness in the south, see ROBERT PERKINSON, TEXAS
TOUGH: THE RISE OF AMERICA'S PRISON EMPIRE (2010); MONA LYNCH, SUNBELT JUSTICE:
ARIZONA AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN PUNISHMENT (2009). Data source: Nicole
D. Porter, On the Chopping Block 2012: State Prison Closings, 5, (Dec. 2012), available at
http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/On%20the%20Chopping%2OBlock%202012.pdf.
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Florida Gainesville Correctional 507 beds $9,038, 845
Institution
Florida Hendry Work Camp 280 beds $4,028, 832
Florida Hillsborough Correctional 431 beds $8, 314, 653
Institution
Florida Indian River Correctional 381 beds $8, 027, 931
Institution
Florida Levy Forestry Camp 292 beds $3, 866, 263
Florida New River Correctional 1,363 beds $17, 644, 740
Institution
Florida River Junction Work Camp 736 beds $4, 268, 454
Illinois Dwight Correctional Center 1,212 beds $36, 900,000
Illinois Joliet Renaissance Center- 344 beds $11, 700,000
Youth Center
Illinois Murphysboro Youth Prison 156 beds $6,000,000
Illinois Tamms Super Maximum 700 beds $25, 600,000
Security Correctional Center
Kentucky Otter Creek Correctional 656 beds $9,450,000
Center
Louisiana C. Paul Phelps Correctional 942 beds $12,000,000
Center
Louisiana Forcht-Wade Correctional 498 beds $2,700,000
142 [Vol. 11I
Center
Louisiana J. Levy Dabadie Correctional 300 beds $3,000,000
Center
Total Beds and Project Cost Savings 14,100 beds $337, 380,141
In light of prison closures being closed to save vital resources, "at
midyear for fiscal year 2012 states reported cutting correctional
expenditures by $67.5 million."l8 2  Furthermore, "[a]n examination of
projected budgets for fiscal year 2013 indicates that at least 12 states are
planning to decrease correctional expenditures, with prison closures being
one mechanism to do so."' But beyond the obvious savings, how have the
closures impacted prison conditions?
Some of the reports have been encouraging, as some of the prison
closures stem from actual sentencing reforms. But in some cases, prison
closures unaccompanied by a proportionate decrease in inmate numbers just
means more overcrowding. In Illinois, Governor Quinn had to defend his
initiative to shut down prisons in court, 84 and then battled the resulting
overcrowding by filling gymnasiums with beds. 1 Similar concerns about
overcrowding arose in Boston'86 and New York. 17
Another important question pertains to the ability to repurpose closing
prisons. In some cases, states have been able to use closed men's prisons as
women's prisons, repurpose juvenile institutions as adult institutions, and
the like. Some institutions present special problems in that regard;
182. Porter, supra note 163, at 3.
183. Id.
184. Kurt Erickson, Court Lifts Prison Closures Injunction; Quinn Pledges Action within
Weeks, HERALD & REv. (Feb. 20, 2012), http://herald-review.com/news/state-and-regional/court-
lifts-prison-closures-injunction-quinn-pledges-action-within-weeks/article_4d70ccca-4a6d-
S1e2bc63-0019bb2963f4.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2013).
185. Monique Garcia & Rafael Guerrero, Quinn Stands by Decision to Close 2 Prisons, Despite
Inmate Crowding, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 18, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-02-18/news/ct-
met-quinn-prison-closures-0219-20130219_1_three-transitional-centers-inmate-population-tamms (last
visited Sept. 1, 2013); see also Aaron Cynic, Quinn Defends Prison Closures Amid Overcrowding
Complaints, CHICAGOIST (Feb. 22, 2013), http://chicagoist. comi/2013/02/22/despite-
overcrowding..quinn-defends.php (last visited Sept. 1, 2013).
186. Johanna Kaiser, Officials on Prison-Closure Plan: They're Already Overcrowded,
LOWELL SUN (Jan. 28, 2011), http://www.lowellsun.com/todaysheadlines/ci_17226167 (last
visited Sept. 1, 2013).
1 87. Cara Matthews, Union: Prisons Overcrowded; State Shouldn't Close More, POL. ON
THE HUDSON (Mar. 23, 2011), http://polhudson.lohudblogs.com/2011/03/23/union-prisons-are-
overcrowded-state-shouldnt-close-more (last visited Sept. 1, 2013).
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maximum-security prisons with Secure Housing Units (SHU) in them,
which are small and windowless, are unable to serve other purposes.
Nonetheless, the Vera Institute and the ACLU were able to implement its
segregation reduction project in Illinois, Maine, Mississippi, Colorado, and
Michigan, where states figured that, even with cells left empty and
repurposed, there were considerable fiscal savings involved in emptying
them.'
But one of the most important ways in which states can repurpose their
closed prisons can be offering the space to less prudent states. We now turn
to a phenomenon that combines privatization, prison closures and
repurposing: a massive trend of incarcerating inmates out of state.
IV. The Inmate Export Business: Geographic Shifts in
Incarceration
Chronic prison overcrowding has resulted in a trend towards exporting
more and more prisoners across state lines. Prisoners are transferred across
states by way of enforceable legal contracts known as "interstate
compacts." 89 Currently, there are three interstate compacts governing the
transfer of inmates across state lines: "the National Interstate Compact for
Corrections" (national) and "the Western Corrections Compact and New
England Corrections Compact" (both regional). Forty states are currently
signed on to the national agreement, although there are other mechanisms
by which the interstate transfer of inmates may occur, including by statute
or court order.190
As of July 1, 2005, Departments of Corrections in at least 43 states
had inmates on transferred status in the custody of other public
agencies. Approximately 4,900 inmates were on transferred status
nationwide; of this number, there were 2,089 state-sentenced
inmates were transferred between state prison systems, 345 were
transferred to the Federal Bureau of Prisons, and 2,466 were
transferred to private prisons in another state.'9 1
188. ACLU, State Reforms to Reduce the Use of Solitary Confinement,
https://www.aclu.org/ files/assets/statereformstolimittheuseofsolitary-confinement.pdf
(last visited Oct. 21, 2013).
189. Randall G. Shelden & Selena Teji, Collateral Consequences of Interstate Transfers of
Prisoners, CTR. ON JUV. AND CRIM. JUST. 1 (July 2012), http://www.cjcj.org/uploads/
cjcj/documents/Out ofstatetransfers.pdf.
190. Id. at 2.
191. Id., citing Morris L. Thigpen, George Keiser & Kermit Humphries, Interstate Transfer
of Prison Inmates in the United States, SPECIAL ISSUES IN CORR., Feb. 2006.
144 [Vol. 11I
The primary reason for interstate transfer of inmates was prison
overcrowding, followed by inmate safety.19 2  Of the transfers due to
overcrowding, 95% were sent to private prisons.'9 The explosive growth
of private prisons during the 1980s served a dual purpose: to accommodate
the tough-on-crime ideology that was increasingly permeating the national
consciousness and to provide economic opportunities for towns that
suffered from a decline in manufacturing and other industries.194 Prisons
began to pop up in rural and more isolated areas that had suffered
economically, the collateral effect of which was more and more prisoners
being shipped off to serve sentences far away from their homes and
familhes. 195
Studies suggest that this separation from the familial structure can
significantly hinder prisoners' rehabilitation, which, in turn, increases the
risk of recidivism. As Shelden and Teji note, "[i]nterstate transfer virtually
eliminates visitation by family members; exacerbated when private prisons
are involved as they are not held to the same visitation and rehabilitation
standards as the sending state."' 96  The ramifications of the depletion of
state prison resources extend beyond the financial and practical impact on
the state infrastructure. Inmates shipped to private prisons far away from
their home states also face psychological repercussions resulting from being
hundreds, or even thousands, of miles away from their families. Almost all
of the 30% of Alaska's inmates living in private prison facilities do so in
Arizona.19 7 In 2000, an Alaskan court went so far as to rule that a prisoner
who was moved to a CCA facility in Arizona had his Constitutional rights
jeopardized because the Alaska Constitution guarantees a prisoner's right to
rehabilitation, and that visitation was part and parcel of the rehabilitative
process.' 98 By shipping the prisoner to Arizona, the state was effectively
preventing any meaningful visitation rights that the prisoner might have. 199
In support of this view is research indicating that
[v]isitation plays such a key role because it prevents prisoners
from being "socialized to the life of an inmate [and helps
transform them into] individuals who have the necessary skills and
192. Shelden & Teji, supra note 189, at 2.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 5, citing RANDALL G. SHELDEN, OUR PUNITIVE SOCIETY (2010).
196. Shelden & Teji, supra note 189, at4.
197. Shymeka L. Hunter, More Than Just a Private Affair: Is the Practice of Incarcerating
Alaska Prisoners in Private Out-of-State Prisons Unconstitutional?, 17 ALASKA L. REV. 319, 328
(2000)
198. Shelden & Teji, supra note 189, at 4.
199. Hunter, supra note 197, at 321.
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emotional stability to face up to their responsibilities as citizens,
parents and spouses." Moreover, when prisoners are able to
maintain contact with family members during incarceration, they
are more likely to sustain their relationships after their release.
Inmates who have families to support them upon release are less
likely to return to a life of crime. 200
Bob Weier is a Hawaiian inmate who has served out his prison
sentence in Minnesota, Oklahoma, and most recently a private prison in
Arizona. 2 0 1 In 2007, a 53-year-old Weier told the New York Times that
"[y]ou lose your family identity." 20 2 At the time, Mr. Weier had never met
his five grandchildren and had not seen his daughter in eleven years. 20 3 Of
losing his family identity, he added, "that's not good, because when we go
back into society-and more than 95 percent of us will-the only ones who
are going to take care of you are your family.", 204 Compounding these
difficulties, each time Weier was transferred to a different out-of-state
prison, "he had to reapply for phone privileges, a process that can take six
months. Even when he was allowed to call home, he said, he could not
always afford the long-distance bills." 2 05
Weier is not alone. Hawaii is unique in the extent to which it is
involved in the inmate export business. A special 2011 report by University
of Hawaii sociologist David Johnson 2 06 revealed that 54 percent of the state
prisoners are incarcerated on the mainland.207 The financial reasons for this
policy are not as obvious as they may seem. As of the end of 2009, it cost
approximately $118 per day to incarcerate an inmate on the islands, and at
least $62 per day to incarcerate him or her in a private institution on the
mainland. 08 However, after Hawaiian female inmates were sexually
abused in a private institution in Kentucky, 209 Suspicions on the Islands
200. Hunter, supra note 197, at 342, citing Justin Brooks & Kimberly Bahna, "It's a Family
Affair" - The Incarceration of the American Family: Confronting Legal and Social Issues, 28
U.S.F. L. REV. 271, 277 (1994).
201. Solomon Moore, States Export Their Inmates as Prisons Fill, N.Y. TIMES (July 31,
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/3 1/us/3 I prisons.html?pagewanted=all.
202. Id.
203. States Export Their Inmates, supra note 201.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. David Johnson et al., Hawaii's Imprisonment Policy and the Performance of Parolees
Who Were Incarcerated In-State and on the Mainland, Department of Sociology University of
Hawaii at Manoa & Department of the Attorney General State of Hawaii, Jan. 2011,
http://ag.hawaii.gov/cpja/files/2013/01/AH-UH-Mainland-Prison-Study-2011.pdf (last visited
Sept. 1, 2013).
207. Id. at 1.
208. Id.
209. Urbina, supra note 126.
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about cheaper incarceration were aroused, and the report found that the
private prison cost assessment was far from being inclusive. 21 0 The report
found no significant difference in recidivism rates between inmates
incarcerated in Hawaii and in the mainland, and the report recommended
reassessing the benefits involved in out-of-state incarceration with short-
term costs being only one, but not the main, consideration. 2 1 1
Arizona is also an important state in the inmate export business, but on
the importing side. Inmates from as far as Alaska and Vermont have been
shipped to facilities run by Correctional Corporations of America in
Arizona.2 12 Simultaneously, Arizona has found itself up against serious
overcrowding issues. In an effort to alleviate this problem, Arizona initially
looked to house some of its own inmates in private prisons out of state. In
2007, over 2,000 Arizona inmates were being housed in prisons in Indiana
and Oklahoma.2 13
Efforts to place yet more Arizona inmates out of state were often
thwarted in favor of private prison corporations putting the bottom line first.
For example, Arizona found its overcrowding problem exacerbated when
"two private prisons in Texas now run by the GEO Group, canceled
Arizona's contract and instead signed more lucrative deals with federal
corrections agencies." 214
Unreliability on the part of the private prison companies often led to
Arizona officials scrambling to find a place to house its overflow of
inmates. In 2010, Arizona announced plans to phase out-of-state beds out
of its budget. 215 This decision came on the heels of a 2005 finding Arizona
was paying private contractors "$11 per prisoner per day more than the
average daily costs of state-operated prisons, totaling approximately $4.1
million in extra spending by the state per year." 2 16 In lieu of shipping
inmates to private prisons in states such as Oklahoma and Colorado,
Arizona has opted to contract with private prison companies to provide
more beds in-state to house its prisoners, all the while continuing to take in
prisoners from places such as Alaska and Hawaii. 217  Today, 16% of
Arizona's inmates are housed in private prison facilities, with plans to build
210. Johnson, supra note 206, at 33.
211. Id. at 2-3.
212. Shelden & Teji, supra note 189, at 4.
213. Moore, supra note 201.
214. Id.
215. CCA Reports Arizona Budget Proposals to Phase Out Utilization, BLOOMBERG (Jan.
21, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid-newsarchive&sid=ag9tf5eDvLHc.
216. Lucas Anderson, Kicking the National Habit: The Legal and Policy Arguments for
Abolishing Private Prison Contracts, 39 PUB. CONT. L.J. 113, 130-31 (2009).
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1,000 medium security beds in private facilities on the horizon. 2 18
Curiously, this comes at a time when Arizona's prison population is
actually in decline for the first time in decades. 219 Recently, "corrections
records show that in fiscal 2011 there were 296 fewer prisoners than the
previous year, and this past fiscal year that ended June 30, there were 304
fewer inmates for a total of 38,977."220 While State Corrections Director
Charles Ryan chocked up this decline to "fewer parole revocations, fewer
illegal immigrants being placed in state custody and an overall downturn in
crime," but nonetheless maintained that more beds were needed, because
empty beds currently exist primarily in women's medium-security facilities
at which other types of inmates cannot be housed. 22 1 Adversaries to the
private prison expansion currently underway in Arizona also look to recent
information showing that "the average daily cost per inmate in a state-run,
medium-custody facility in 2010 was $48.42, while the average daily cost
for an inmate in a similar private facility was $53.02. That translates into a
9.5% higher cost per inmate for a private prison."222
One particularly robust critique of private prison operations in Arizona
stems from concern that there is a lack of oversight as to the out-of-state
prisoners that private prison contractors house in Arizona facilities.2 23
While Arizona corrections officials maintain oversight criminals convicted
in Arizona and housed in private facilities, Arizona has no say in what
kinds of inmates private prisons in Arizona accept from other states or from
the federal government. Rather,
[i]n those situations, private-prison operators work with their
outside-government partners on training specifications and other
operational details. They report to Arizona only the names,
security classifications, and number of inmates housed at their
facilities. State statutes do not require private operators to provide
Arizona officials details about the crimes the prisoners committed
or escape data.225
The lack of oversight by Arizona officials stirred controversy in 2007
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when
two convicted killers sent from another state stole ladders from a
maintenance building and climbed onto a roof at a private prison
outside Florence. Brandishing a fake gun, they climbed over the
prison walls and escaped to freedom. One was caught within
hours, but it was almost a month before the other was caught
hundreds of miles away in his home state of Washington.226
Following this incident, a 2008 bill was drafted by then-Governor
Janet Napolitano's office that would have required private prisons in
Arizona to meet state construction standards.227 The bill also would have
put an end to private prisons allowing murderers, rapists and convicted
felons into Arizona from out-of-state, and require private prison companies
to share further out-of-state inmate information with Arizona officials.228
The bill ultimately died.229
If the number of overall inmates in Arizona is down, and empirical
evidence shows that housing inmates in private prisons is more expensive
than housing them in state-run facilities, why the continued push for
privatization? One answer may lie on the impact that private prisons have
on local economies.
A for-profit prison system with questionable oversight is not what a
state like Arizona needs, but communities that stand to benefit from the
presence of private prisons have been rallying around efforts to expand
privatization. 2 30  In Florence, Arizona, the state's unofficial "prison
capital," a public hearing on the issue of private prisons reflected a nearly
ubiquitous consensus that such prisons would be welcome. 23 1 At the
hearing,
Florence's mayor, town officials and the school superintendent all
voiced support for more inmate beds, after they were told by GEO
Group that the company's proposal to build a new 1,000-bed
prison would create 200 construction jobs, 260 jobs at the facility
and a $12 million annual payroll. 232
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Added Mayor Tom Rankin, "We are proud of our institutions, and
proud to have a much-needed service to the state . . . It will create more
jobs, and more jobs mean that more people will shop here." 233  With a
national economy in peril, it appears that the bottom-line appeal of private
prisons has the power to extend beyond financial benefits to the
corporations themselves and into the communities that they affect.
V. Passing the Buck: Jurisdictional Shifts in Incarceration
Pricing the Correctional New Lunch
One way in which corrections officials are seeking to cut costs is by
shifting inmate populations from state prisons to county jails. The idea
behind doing so is to eliminate the fiscal problem that Franklin Zimring and
Gordon Hawkins referred to as the "correctional free lunch": charging and
sentencing done on the county level, while the state picks up the tab for
234incarceration. If, instead, prisons were run locally, and states would
allocate money to localities to make incarceration decisions as they saw fit,
the costs involved in incarceration would at least be internalized and taken
into account when designing policy. 23 5
The main example of recession-driven jurisdictional shifts is, of
course, the California criminal justice realignment, which consists of
several complex legislative changes.236 First, the new legislation identifies
hundreds of felonies that are eligible for jail sentences.2 37 Second, it shifts
the sentencing rules governing nonviolent, nonsexual, nonserious offenders
(the "non-non-nons"), 238 not only by transferring their incarceration locus
from the state to the county, but also by providing judges with an array of
233. Harris, supra note 217.
234. FRANKLIN ZIMRING &GORDON HAWKINS, THE SCALE OF IMPRISONMENT (1991): "The
parable of the free lunch is relevant to the discussion of prison population because prisons in the
United States are . .. paid for at the state level of government out of state correctional budgets, but
prison populations are determined by the number of prisoners referred by local officials and the
length of sentences imposed at the local level. Since localities do not contribute to central state
correctional budgets, the marginal cost of an extra prisoner may be zero at the local level of
government, where the decision to confine is made."
235. W. David Ball, Defunding State Prisons, (Jan. 1, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with Santa Clara Law).
236. See Aaron Rappaport, Realingning California Corrections, 25(4) FED. SENT'G REP.
207 (2013), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/fsr.2013.25.4.207.
237. Id.
238. California Penal Code section 1170(h) amends hundreds of felonies so as to make them
punishable by a term in county jail. As opposed to "wobblers," offenses that can be tried as
felonies or misdemeanors, these would be felonies, and the only difference is in the physical place
of confinement. The Department of State, and the California courts, treats the "non-non-nons" as
felons for all other purposes, including felon disenfranchisement. Hadar Aviram & Jessica Willis,
Reintegrating Citizens: Felon Disenfranchisement, Realignment, and the California Constitution,
ST. JOHN'S J. C.R. & ECON. DEv. (forthcoming).
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sentencing tools, including "mandatory supervision" 239 and in other
programs.240 Third, realignment fundamentally alters parole by shifting the
responsibilities for many out-of-prison parolees away from the state and to
the counties. In addition, the legislation has required counties to create
alternatives to sentencing and reentry programs. Whether Governor Jerry
Brown's push for realignment was a response to the fiscal crisis, the
continuation of efforts at jurisdictional shifts from the Schwarzenegger
gubernatorial administration, or an answer to pressure from federal courts to
comply with the Supreme Court mandate in Brown v. Plata, depends on
one's perspective; lawmakers, lawyers, judges and other stakeholders offer
a range of explanations, from a mere saving mechanism to a real change in
policy. 2
42
The jurisdictional shift raises two main problems. First, big variation
among counties regarding incarceration and rehabilitation policies, and
second, a concern referred to by Margo Schlanger as "the hydra": shifting
dysfunction and abuse from state prisons to county jails. Both problems
have already arisen in the context of the realignment.243
Each of California's fifty-eight counties has opted for a slightly
different policy to address the incoming inmates.244 Research conducted by
the Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice since the Realignment's
implementation reveals the variation in strategies adopted by the different
counties. The average number of new prison admissions in 2012, per 1,000
felony arrests, was 90 statewide; Kings County was responsible for 237
admissions per 1,000 felony arrests, and San Francisco County for 25.245
Thirty-two out of the 58 counties, notably Los Angeles, have opted to
construct more jails using state funds. Other counties have strived to
improve their existing facilities to better serve longer term inmate S.246 And
other counties have aimed at reducing their reliance on incarceration
altogether and finding alternative approaches to sentencing, such as relying
239. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.1 (2012).
240. Such as electronic monitoring (sections 1203.017, 1203.018) and programs for women
with history of substance abuse (section 1174.4).
241. See Schlanger, supra note 10, at 187.
242. Id. at 175.
243. Id. at 210.
244. Kathryn Jett & Joan Hancock, Realignment in the Counties, 25 FED. SENT'G REP. 236
(2013).
245. Mike Males & Lizzie Buchen, Beyond Realignment: Counties' Large Disparities in
Imprisonment Underlie Ongoing Prison Crisis, CTR. ON JUV. AND CRIM. JUST., March 2013, at 4,
available at http://www.cjcj.org/uploads/cjcj/documents/beyond-realignment-march_2013.pdf
(last visited Sept. 3, 2013).
246. Leroy D. Baca & Gerald K. Cooper, Can AB 109 Work in Los Angeles County?, 25
FED. SENT'G REP. 241 (2013).
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more on the mandatory supervision option. 24 7  The resulting disparities
make it difficult to assess the success of realignment as an option, a
problem compounded by the difficulty in obtaining data from all 58
counties. 248
These varying county approaches are facilitated using subsidies from
the state, which brings up the question of fund allocation to the counties. In
the early stages of Realignment, funding to the counties was based on the
number of parolees returning to them from state prison. This created
perverse economic incentives, because counties that were doing a poor job
finding alternatives for incarceration were rewarded financially for their
poor choices, allowing them to continue making said poor choices. W.
David Ball has advocated a system that was adopted later on, which
requires allocating funds based on county rates on violent crime, which
arguably are a better representation of a given county's incarceration
needs.24 9
The second concern has to do with the "hydra" problem: Shifting
inmates from state prisons to county jails may reproduce the problematic
incarceration conditions in the local settings. This becomes a serious issue
when considering that jail conditions, in themselves, were not necessarily
better than state prison conditions before the realignment. 2 50 And, indeed,
the fierce litigation over health care in prisons, which produced the
Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Plata, is now echoed by emerging
litigation against county jails with similarly abysmal health care. One such
case is the Riverside Jail, mentioned above for its new policy of charging its
inmates $140 per night.2 5 1 The hotel-scale fee becomes even more absurd
when considering current conditions-triple-stacked bunk beds to handle
the flow of inmates, a months-long wait for the jail's 4,000 inmates before
seeing a doctor, cursory exams and inadequate follow-up. 2 52
The realignment may, indeed, be the biggest experiment in
247. Callie Shanafelt, Alameda Probation Chief Sees Opportunity in Prison Reform, CAL.
HEALTH REP. (Aug. 30, 2011), http://www.healthycal.org/archives/5559 (last visited Oct. 13,
2013).
248. Mona Lynch, Realigning Research: A Proposed (Partial) Agenda for Sociolegal
Scholars, 25(4) FED. SENT'G REP. 1 (2013).
249. W. David Ball, Tough on Crime (on the State's Dime): How Violent Crime Does Not
Drive California Counties' Incarceration Rates - And Why It Should, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 987,
1075 (2012).
250. Indeed, some of the more atrocious conditions that yielded federal litigation were in
county jails. See MALCOLM FEELEY AND EDWARD RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICYMAKING AND THE
MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA'S PRISONS (2000).
251. Riverside among California Counties Facing Inmate Lawsuits after State Prison
Realignment, KPCC (Mar. 19, 2013), www.scpr.org/news/2013/03/19/36435/ca-counties-now-
facing-inmate-lawsuits-after-state/ (last visited Sept. 3, 2013).
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jurisdictional shifting, but it is far from being the only one. In Florida, "a
current proposal on the table ... could shift about 5,600 inmates from state
prisons to county jails."2 53 With 20% of county jails in Florida already over
capacity, critics of the proposal suggest that instituting a realignment policy
similar to that in California merely shifts the burden of improving the
prison system from the state to the counties.254 Proponents of the proposal,
however, counter that transferring inmates to county jails will alleviate a
financial burden by saving the state $47.7 million per year.255 While
transferring inmates from the state to the counties entails financial
incentives for the state, the move would likely cost the counties $100
million--over twice as much as the state would save.256 The way that the
proposed shift would be implemented is as follows,
Today, anyone sentenced to more than a year behind bars is sent to
a state prison, with credit for "time served" in a local jail while
awaiting trial and sentencing. Under the proposal, if this "time
served" credit knocks the remainder of the sentence down to less
than a year, the inmate would remain in the jail for the duration of
the sentence.257
The Association of Counties is gearing up to try and combat the
proposal, which would require a change in state sentencing laws. Concern
over the proposal's passage stems from the fact that, "for counties, which
have been forced to make cut spending [sic] over the last few years because
of falling property-tax revenues, the extra financial burden would create
budget havoc. Some aren't even sure where they'd put extra inmates." 2 58
Conclusion
Some developments in criminal justice policy, such as the increasing
number of states to abolish the death penalty or decriminalize marijuana,
would lead us to the conclusion that the financial crisis has had a salutary
effect on the American correctional landscape. And, indeed, those big
changes are, in large part, the silver lining of the crisis, which has made
253. Will Florida Follow in California's Path?, CORRECTIONAL NEWS (Dec. 12, 2012),
http://www.correctionalnews.com/articles/2012/12/12/will-florida-follow-in-califomia-s-path.
254. Kathleen Haughney, Counties Fear $100M Cost of State Cost-Cutting Proposal, THE
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mass incarceration, if not less palatable, at least economically
unsustainable. But those shifts and changes are only part of a complicated
picture, as the examples in this paper demonstrate. The myriad techniques
and practices that states and localities have adopted to save money on
corrections in a time of austerity-privatization, out-of-state incarceration,
prison closures, bartering with other states, jurisdictional shifts-reveal a
society that has not come to the conclusion that it is time for the punitive
pendulum to swing in the other direction. We are not quite ready to "exit
Nixonland policy-wise, but since we cannot afford to sentence and,",259
incarcerate at the same scale, these changes resemble emergency measures
more than they resemble well-thought penal reform efforts.
It is also important to keep the overall decline in state prison
populations in perspective. Despite the decline 25 states, as well as the
federal government, had stable or increasing prison populations as late as
2010.260
Why, then, has the financial crisis been successful in fueling the
political struggle to abolish the death penalty and legalize marijuana, and so
unsuccessful in creating long-lasting correctional policies? The answer is, I
believe, complicated. First, the common feature of abolition and marijuana
legalization is their high political profile, which means that educating the
public about the costs of public choice in these issues can be successful,
provided that the campaign is authentic, persuasive, and that reform would
not negatively affect public safety. Issues of overcrowding, budgeting and
incarceration options tend to be polycentric questions with many moving
parts, 2 6 1 which are far less easy to settle, whether in a polarized legislature
or in a referendum in a neopopulist state.262 Since resolving prison
overcrowding is a complex task, which cannot be answered by a yes/no
vote from the public, the maneuvers this paper describes take place behind
closed doors, in negotiation settings between prison administrators and
private service providers.
These providers are the second important factor. The existence of
strong economic interests to preserve and increase mass incarceration acts
as a counterweight to the need to create policies that better fit economically
lean times. It is difficult for states to pare down their prisons when they are
259. Term borrowed from Jonathan Simon's blog GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME,
http://govemingthroughcrime.blogspot.com/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2013).
260. Porter, supra note 163, at 5.
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tied up in contractual obligations with private providers and with other
states to provide space, inmates, or both. The Arizona example, discussed
in this article in depth, is particularly important; returning to the "tough 'n'
cheap" days of early penal policies may not be a realistic expectation, but
the strong partnership with CCA and other private elements is yielding a
postmodem version of "tough 'n' efficient."
Of course, the question is whether overcrowding inmates in private
institutions, shipping them away from their families, and shifting them out
of state institutions and into county jails is "efficient" in terms of recidivism
reduction. And that is a third important factor: Austere times do not yield
themselves easily to long-term planning that may require expenditures on
prison rehabilitation programs and reentry schemes. The temptation to cut
costs in the short term until the economy improves is understandable, but
without a significant shift toward rehabilitation and true hope for recidivism
reduction it is unlikely to yield results that will please us when the economy
improves.
The lesson to be learned from these policies is that, while costs are a
powerful motivator behind policy changes, they cannot achieve everlasting
positive reform without keeping the more fundamental arguments about
human dignity, hope, and belief in change, on the table. Let us hope these
don't get lost when the recession comes to an end.
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